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The quality of government (QoG) is a concept without an undisputed benchmark. To contribute to 
its clarification, we propose a novel model of analysis that incorporates formal and informal institu-
tions and operationalizes such an abstract and debated concept, applying it empirically to the study 
of two Spanish regions, the Basque Country and Andalusia, which, in principle, have extremely dif-
ferent QoG values, according to the European Quality of Government Index (EQI). Our results do 
not find the differences that might be expected between regions with such different EQI scores. One 
explanation for this is the excessive weight given in these indices to the perception of the quality of 
public services, a component notably influenced by the level of public spending in each society. We 
conclude that QoG indexes need to adequately weight differences in the levels of wealth of the soci-
eties being compared. 
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Particularism and quality of government 
The quality of government (QoG) is crucial to fight against corruption and the waste of public re-
sources (Rothstein, 2011). Although the concept is controversial and its use in empirical research 
gives rise to considerable discussion (Agnafors, 2013, Grindle, 2007), some basic normative criteria 
can be found that encompass the essential content of what would be a government with high quality 
(Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi, 2009). 
Attempts to specify the set of instruments, processes and structures that ensure the quality of gov-
ernment are doomed to failure. The different political cultures, historical trajectories and institutional 
legacies that we find in each country mean that the same institutional solution cannot travel comfort-
ably from one country to another without being distorted. However, following Holmberg et al. (2009: 
157), what is really important to understand QoG is not so much the set of specific institutions that 
may coincide in the same country, but the normative foundations under such institutions. And in 
these foundations, there is a certain space of coincidence between the literature that has worked on 
this issue. 
Indeed, there are three different theories in the contemporary literature on QoG that account for the 
essential content of this complex concept. These are the following: the principle of impartiality in the 
exercise of public power (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008), the open access orders versus those of limited 
access (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006), or, finally, the universalistic political culture versus the 
particularistic one of Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2006). Taken from different points of view, these three 
theories have much in common and serve to distill the essentials of QoG. Ultimately, it is about 
making the principle of political equality a reality (Dahl, 1989). These proposals are based on the 
arbitrary non-discrimination of citizens and on preventing all privileged access to government insti-
tutions by particularistic interests of certain groups compared to the rest of society. 
In this paper, after asking ourselves how to measure QoG in democracies, we propose two objectives. 
On the one hand, we build a model of analysis to detect and understand the differences in this es-
sential core of QoG. On the other, we apply this model to two case studies that we have chosen for 
two reasons. First, these are two cases of regional governments that have belonged to the same coun-
try for centuries and therefore share, to a large extent, a similar political culture and a similar institu-
tional legacy. It is true that these two territories already have a history of forty years of political au-
tonomy in which they have been developing different experiences of institutional construction and 
diverse styles of public policies, although the weight of historical legacies and institutional isomor-
phism, together with the fact of sharing the same constitutional order, makes the differentiation not 
so great. 
The second reason for choosing these two cases is that, despite all that they share, they present a 
notable difference in their levels of quality of government (see table 1), according to the measure-
ments of this made by the Institute of Quality of Government from the University of Gothenburg 
on subnational governments in Europe using its European Quality of Government Index (EQI) 
(Charron et al., 2019). The Autonomous Communities of the Basque Country and Andalusia rank 
first and last in the latest EQI available when we started this research corresponding to 2017 among 
the 17 Spanish Autonomous Communities, it being also the case that Spain is the second European 
country after Italy in which the disparity in the quality levels of regional governments is the greatest 
The EQI is the only global measure of the quality of government in sub-national areas, hence its 
importance for our study. The 2017 edition was carried out from a survey of 78,000 citizens from 
193 regions in 21 European countries. In this selection of cases, we follow the strategy of George 
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and Bennett (2005: 23) that this is an adequate strategy to identify "the possible causal routes and the 
variables that lead to the dependent variable of interest." 
TABLE 1: BASQUE COUNTRY AND ANDALUSIA IN EQI 2017 
 
 BASQUE COUNTRY ANDALUSIA 
 SCORE RANK SCORE RANK 






EU AVERAGE 49 
QUALITY 77,1 37/202 44,2 152/202 
IMPARCIAL-
ITY 
69,7 68/202 39,9 152/202 
CORRUPTION 55,8 88/202 36,2 152/202 
 
Source: Data from the scorecards of EQI2017 published by DG Regio at the European Commission. These data are standardized 
between a minimal value of 0 and a maximum of 100: 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/maps/quality_of_governance%232#2 
 
From now on the paper proceeds as follows. The following section presents the theoretical founda-
tion and the methodology used in two separate subsections: first we describe our model of analysis 
on the determinants of the quality of government; in the second subsection, the operationalization 
that has been carried out of this model is presented. We have recurred to three different sources of 
data: an original public opinion survey, interviews with experts from the regional governments ana-
lyzed, and statistical data on our two cases. In section 3 the key results of the study are shown and in 
section 4 we discuss their main implications. Finally, the last section concludes. 
 
Material and methods 
 
A model to analyze the essential core of the quality of government 
 
As mentioned above, by "essential core of the quality of government" we mean the coincidence that 
can be observed in the meaning that Rothstein and Teorell, North, Wallis and Weingast, and Mungiu-
Pippidi give to the three terms that they employ in their studies. In short, we will focus on the terms 
used and contrasted by Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) of universalism and particularism. In this way, these 
two terms try to differentiate between two types of opposite social orders (Parsons and Shils, 1951). 
In a society in which universalism rules, we find that general laws and rules are more important than 
personal relationships in guiding the behavior of its members, while, in particularistic societies, per-
sonal relationships take precedence above the rules as the criterion to determine what is ethically 
acceptable and how to behave (Banfield, 1958). 
 
In particularism, politicians advance in their careers by developing the capacity to catering very spe-
cific interests of small groups of citizens, rather than large programmatic objectives that can be shared 
by many different social sectors. In this way, ties of personal loyalty develop between political leaders 
and the groups of citizens whose interests they seek to serve. This results in the fact that, in order to 
comply with these particularistic obligations in the exercise of public power, the rule of impartiality 
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in the operation of public administrations is undermined, since it is often necessary to skip the general 
rules in order to be able to comply with the commitments that give rise to the relationships of per-
sonal loyalty on which political representation is based. 
 
Based on contributions such as those of Piattoni (2001), Sousa (2009), de Blasio et al., (2014) and 
Rotondi and Stanca (2015), an analytical tool has been developed that can be used to study particu-
laristic attitudes. The goal is to evaluate the different dimensions that such a tool should have (see 
Table 2). 
 
The starting point of this tool is, following Simona Piattoni (2001), to distinguish between the supply 
and demand sides of particularism. Therefore, our questionnaires got information about both 
spheres. Regarding the supply side, it is important to know two things. On the one hand, a key aspect 
is to evaluate how wide is the margin of discretion that politicians on top of public organizations 
have to distribute public resources in a particularized way. This means paying attention to the degree 
of politicization / partisanship of public administrations. On the other, it is necessary to know if 
political leaders are inclined to build their social support through a particularized distribution of di-
visible public benefits. 
 
With regard to the demand for particularism, we can group all the relevant dimensions around two 
main axes. The first set of dimensions has to do with an assessment of citizens' resources to mobilize 
in pursuit of their demands, paying attention to their greater or lesser capacity to unite interests. This 
means looking at the following dimensions: education (the lower the educational level, the more 
difficult to add interests); organization (skills and resources to articulate the aggregation of interests); 
financial means; main sources of political information; and membership in civic associations that 
have general objectives. 
 
The second group of dimensions is the set of attitudes and beliefs that allow people to discount the 
moral cost of behaving against the rules, helping them to resolve cognitive dissonance to justify be-
haviors contrary to socially accepted rules. In this sense, trust in others and in the main political 
institutions is a key aspect to assess how costly it is to behave opportunistically against the general 
interest of society. Therefore, a low level of generalized trust or a low level of institutional trust (trust 
in major political institutions, such as parliament or government, and in public officials) makes it 
easier for an individual to justify opportunistic behavior. 
 
TABLE 2: DIMENSIONS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT FOR ASSESSING THE DEGREE OF PARTIC-
ULARISTIC ATTITUDES 
 
SUPPLY SIDE DEMAND SIDE 




Sources political information 
Membership civic associations 
Proneness of leaders to build support 
through distribution of divisible benefits 
Conditions for solving cognitive disso-
nance 
Generalized and institutional trust 






The operationalization of the model: data and methods. 
 
We have collected the information for our analysis from three very different sources: official statistical 
data; a public opinion survey of a representative sample of Basque and Andalusian citizens; and in-
depth interviews with good connoisseurs of the operation of these two regional governments. 
 
Specifically, we conducted 12 in-depth interviews in the Basque Country with 14 people, and 8 inter-
views in Andalusia with 10 people. Most of those interviewed have held senior positions in the au-
tonomous administrations of our two regions and have recently retired, although we also spoke with 
some academics, a journalist and a representative of a civic association. 
 
Regarding the survey, the field work was carried out by Metroscopia company with a sample of 600 
cases for Andalusia and 500 for the Basque Country1. Table 3 summarizes the indicators with which 
we have collected the information corresponding to each of the dimensions of our model of analysis. 
 
TABLE 3: INDICATORS USED TO OPERATIONALIZE THE VARIABLES IN THE MODEL 
 
VARIABLES INDICATORS 
DV: Quality regional government Values for Basque Country and Andalusia at EQI2017 
SUPPLY SIDE: 
Politicization of public administra-
tions 
Interviews to experts. 
Poll: perception of partiality at the autonomous administrations (perception on whether assign-
ments are based on merit and capacity, and perception on whether people and entities linked to 
the government are treated with favoritism) 
Proneness of leaders to build sup-




A) Resources for mobilization: 
Education Official statistics and rate of early school abandonment 
Organization 
Statistical data as proxy on the organizative skills of different citizens groups: percentage of 
active population in agriculture and companies’ sizes 
Financial means 
Through proxies: GNP per capita; gross disposable income of households per capita; population 
at risk of poverty and exclusion 
Sources of political information 
Proxy: newspapers reading levels in each AC according to data from the EGM (Mass media 
general study) 
Belonging to civic associations 
Official data from the regional administrations on associative density and indicator in the survey 
on the perception of usefulness of associating to achieve collective goals, as well as whether 
the respondent is associated 
B) Factors for solving the cognitive dissonance: 
Generalized and institutional trust Poll: generalized and institutional trust. 
Perception of corruption 
Poll: perception of corruption in different institutions; perception of whether corruption is pursued 
or not; echo in the media; perceived honesty of public office holders; and level of transparency 
Expectations on others’ behavior 
Poll: if Basque / Andalusian citizens are honest; if they comply with the laws; if you recur to 
influential contacts; if in this society contacts are not needed; how a public official is expected to 
face a conflict of interest; the extent to which contacts are necessary for professional or financial 
success; possibility of skipping the waiting lists in health services if you have the right contact. 
Particularistic values 
Poll: what should an official do when faced with a conflict of interest; acceptability of doing favors, 
gifts or giving money to obtain something from a public administration; and whether the pursuit 
of effectiveness can excuse non-compliance with the law. 
 
                                                     
1 The interviews were distributed proportionally to the population of each of the regions by size of municipality 
and establishing sex and age quotas for the last sample unit (individual). The field work was carried out between 
October 25 and 31, 2019. Assuming the maximum indeterminacy (p = q = 50%), the sampling error that would 
correspond to the data referring to the Andalusian sample would be around ± 4.1 points and the sample from 
the Basque Country would be ± 4.5 points. It was a computer-assisted telephone interview, with a structured 
and precoded questionnaire lasting approximately 15 minutes. Finally, having detected an over-representation 
in both samples of people employed in the public sector and since this is a variable with high influence on the 
results, it has been weighted to adjust it to the real distribution of the population according to the INE data, 
maintaining the weight of the variables that constituted the quota criteria to establish both samples. 
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If we accept the measurement of the QoG levels of the EQI2017, we would expect that we will find 
notable differences in each of the four main dimensions of our model of analysis. Specifically, the 
hypothesis we propose is that in each of the dimensions the values corresponding to Andalusia will 
be clearly more negative than in the Basque Country: greater politicization of public bodies; leaders 
more inclined to build their social support by distributing divisible benefits; fewer resources for social 
mobilization; and easier ways to smooth out cognitive dissonance. We review the results found for 




Results corresponding to the four main dimensions of our model are shown separately. 
 
Degree of politicization of public administrations 
 
Although finding sufficiently reliable information on this dimension from survey data is difficult, we 
introduced two related indicators in our questionnaire. We ask citizens if the appointments made in 
the respective autonomous administrations respect the principles of merit and capacity and if such 
administrations treat people and entities related to the respective governments with favoritism. The 
results as a percentage of each of the responses in each region are shown in figures 1 and 2. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: APPOINTMENTS IN BASQUE/ANDALUSIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ARE BASED ON 

























FIGURE 2: IN BASQUE COUNTRY/ANDALUSIA PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS TREAT WITH FAVORIT-





The perception that respondents have about whether appointments in autonomous administrations 
respect the constitutional principles of merit and capacity is significantly better among Basques than 
among Andalusians, although the intensity of the association between the autonomous community 
of the respondent and their response to the question is relatively low. In fact, if we compare the 
percentage of responses accumulated in the values of both extremes of Figure 1, also among the 
Basques there are more critical responses (38.1%) than positive ones (30.3%). Regarding the percep-
tion that the regional administrations give favorable treatment to those related to the government, 
the responses are similarly critical in both regions and the difference is not significant. 
We have done several Multiple Correspondence Analyses (MCA) in order to perceive which are the 
dimensions of our model where we can find a greater distance between our two regions. Figure 3 
summarizes the dimension of the politicization of public administration according to the respondents 







FIGURE 3: MCA ABOUT THE POLITICIZATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
Figure 3 shows that the highest perceptions of impartiality are not related to either of the two Autonomous 
Communities. It is true that perceptions of higher politicization are related more directly to Andalusia, while 
meritocracy in the selection of personnel is more strongly perceived in the Basque Country. But, as observed 
in figures 1 and 2, negative perceptions are stronger than positive ones in both regions. 
 
We also asked about this dimension to the 20 experts we interviewed. The majority opinion among them 
does find a lower degree of politicization in the Basque administration than in the Andalusian one, although 
the experts also introduce interesting nuances in this general opinion. Indeed, the interviewees who served 
as senior officials of the Basque government agreed that political leaders on top of the government do not 
have a great deal of room for maneuver to make patronage use of jobs in the administration (interviewees 
1, 3, 6 and 7). After a few first years of implementation of the regional administration in which the margin 
was higher (interviewee 6)2, a series of changes were introduced to objectify the hiring of new public em-
ployees and it was centralized in the Basque Institute of Public Administration (IVAP) control over the 
selection and careers of officials (interviewees 1, 3, 6 and 7). The IVAP is even in charge of selecting the 
civil servants of some city councils and the temporary workers, who today represent 54% of the total public 
employees of the Basque government and 60% among the group A1 (the top group among civil servants in 
Spain) (interviewees, 1, 3, 6 and 7). These same interviewees point out that the positions with managerial 
functions that are filled by free appointment are very few and are mostly occupied by career civil servants, 
although there is no professional public management yet. 
 
One of our interviewees points out that this same system of little politicized administration also extends to 
the three Provincial Councils (Diputaciones forales) and the large city councils. For example, in Bilbao, 
freely appointed positions are filled after public announcement among all municipal officials, which allows 
political representatives to know the potential of these officials and "generates a very positive work envi-
ronment" (interviewee 5). This same interviewee acknowledges, however, that in these positions political 
loyalty and commitment are also valued, although guaranteeing professional worth. 
                                                     




This group of interviewees also mostly coincide in pointing out how the Basque government is usually a 
coalition government and how the Provincial Councils (except the Biscayan) have been led by different 
parties over the years. In addition, they also point to a factor that could explain why the Basque Nationalist 
Party (PNV), which, except for the period 2009-2012, has always been in charge of the Basque government, 
would not have used this hegemony (despite the absence of majorities in the Basque Parliament) for a 
greater politicization of the public administration (see Figure 4). The key lies in the peculiar role played by 
the machinery of party organization vis-à-vis the leaders who are in government. Unlike the rest of the 
Spanish parties, the PNV maintains a clear separation between the party and the government in such a way 
that the leading cadres of the party remain in the organization and do not disembark in the governments. 
In this way, the party acts as a permanent counterweight to the government that helps it not deviate from 
the social commitments acquired in the elections (interviewees 1 and 5). 
 
With regard to the degree of politicization of the public administrations in Andalusia, our interviewees 
pointed out that, in general, the officials of the Andalusian autonomous administration are “very capable 
and professional” (interviewee 15). However, there is a great consensus also when it comes to pointing out 
the problems. In the first years in which this administration was created ex novo, it was possible to bring 
together a group of competent and committed young professionals who worked with great enthusiasm to 
leave behind a territorial public administration inherited from the Franco regime in which widespread cor-
ruption was nested: "My impulse to enter the administration was to try to end this corruption" (urban plan-
ning expert, interview 13). "At the head of the regional ministries there were prepared people, except a few 
individuals" (interviewee 17). 
 
This promising initial impulse gave rise to a stage of “great brilliance”, which fed a “collective morale for 
the improvement of public management, thanks to the coincidence of good, highly committed profession-
als, bosses with moral prestige and prestigious advisers” (expert in education, interview 13). However, as 
the political hegemony reached by the Socialist Party in Andalusia (PSOE-A) from 1980 onwards was pro-
longed, not only through its excellent results in the Andalusian Parliament (see Figure 4), but also in the 
municipalities and provincial councils, this system of government began to deteriorate and the interests of 
the party began to prevail more clearly: “it becomes politicized in terms of the party”, until “there comes a 
time when an unknown corruption appears that we, technocrats, had not intuited” and that was related to 
the irregular party financing (urban planning expert, interview 13). Beyond corruption, this drift led to a loss 
of “institutional quality” closely related to “poor selection of public managers” (social studies expert, inter-
view 13): “The problem is in the selection of those who occupy the charges, which is very lacking; it has 
always surprised me that my party (the PSOE-A) did not have a system to filter the merits of the nominees”; 




















Source: Electoral data from the electoral administration bodies of both regions.
The result of this evolution, to which the loss of quality of the political class in recent years has also con-
tributed (interviews 13, 14, 16, 18 and 19), is that our interviewees consider that the main problem today in 
the Andalusian public administration is not so much the level of corruption as the "dejection" of the officials 
(interview 13), "a great disappointment and a great demotivation" (interviewee 17), the reigning "bureau-
cracy and mediocrity" (interviewee 14), and the "lack of ambition "in public organizations" (interview 13). 
Curiously, it is a partially coincident diagnosis with the one offered to us by the interviewees in the Basque 
Country who best valued the professionalization of the autonomous administration. As one of them told 
us, despite the high degree of professionalization of this administration, "there is a very strong routinization 
and bureaucratization, a lot of micromanagement, and there is no innovation for fear of any error or lack 
of control"; to which he adds that "the civil service is quite unmotivated by routines and the lack of exciting 
projects, not by corruption or politicization" (interviewee 1). 
 
Proneness of leaders to build support through distribution of divisible benefits 
 
For this dimension of our model of analysis we do not have any indicators based on the survey, as asking 
citizens about this issue does not seem the best way to get sound information about it. For that reason, it 
has been a topic that we have tried to raise in all our interviews. In general terms, there has been much more 
consensus in Andalusia (although not unanimous) than in Euskadi regarding the tendency of political leaders 
to build their social support on the basis of clientelistic or patronage exchanges. 
 
One of our interviewees in Euskadi summarizes very clearly the majority opinion of a good part of our 
interviewees: “The elections are won by giving stability and confidence to the Basque business community; 
the Basque business fabric is strong; this business community is innovative and demanding; it is not about 
clientelistic exchange, it is about providing stability and certainty; within this framework, there may be mu-
tual support strategies, but the key is that there is employment and stability”. This also leads to “a high 
concern to avoid episodes of corruption” (interviewee 1). 
 
However, as we said above, some of our interviewees have a very critical view regarding the use that the 
main government party in Euskadi, the PNV, has made of public resources: “Euskadi presents itself as the 
oasis, but do not believe it, then it is not so different, everything goes through the PNV” (interviewee 11). 
There are not too many incentives to denounce the clientelistic use of public resources because the Basque 






been in power for many years and has generated such a dense clientele network that there is no one inter-
ested in reporting" (interviewee 9). This interviewee also points to the existence of “irregular financing” of 
the PNV through public contracting (interview 9). 
 
One of our interviewees tells us a possible mechanism by which this particularistic use of public resources 
would be carried out in the form of jobs in the administration and its public sector. It would be “a hidden 
form of discrimination, not only in access but especially in the professional career” and that has to do with 
the use of the requirement of a certain level of knowledge of Basque language to be able to enter and ascend 
in the autonomic administration, the provincial councils and the municipalities. The fact that Basque lan-
guage is a requirement and not a merit in many positions becomes a factor that "blocks many people from 
entering" these positions (interviewee 11). Some other interviewee had also mentioned how the requirement 
of a certain level of Basque to be able to access the positions of national qualification officials (secretary, 
controller and treasurer) in Basque municipalities would have become in practice, in small and medium-
sized municipalities, in a factor that prevented finding people who met the requirement and that forced to 
fill these positions so delicate, due to their control functions, with temporary personnel (interviewee 6)3. 
 
However, these critical interviewees acknowledge that "the PNV may have some corruption, but the day-
to-day is clean" (interviewee 12). Or that "the party as such does not have a clientelistic system, but there 
are many people around it who resort to clientelistic and particularistic relationships" (interviewee 11). An-
other of these critical interviewees points out that “there is better public management than in the rest, but 
that does not mean that it is good” and points to the cases of the Zaldíbar landfill disaster4 or the poor 
management of the coronavirus pandemic as examples (interviewee 9). Finally, other interviewees tell us 
that "the PNV has never monopolized all power, so corruption is not as blatant as elsewhere" (interview 8). 
 
In the Andalusian case, the opinion on the extent of clientelism is almost unanimous with the sole exception 
of a former regional president. But for the rest, "the social pressure for particular solutions, the recommen-
dation, is in the whole society, cronyism is everywhere" (interviewee 14). One of our interviewees points to 
the key role of the mayors of the party at the head of the Andalusian government: "a mayor told me that 
the rules are made for enemies, not for friends" (interviewee 15). 
 
Probably, the interviewee who was most forceful on this issue was someone who had responsibilities in the 
water policy of the Andalusian government (interviewee 18). At least in this sector of public policies, "im-
portant decisions are taken behind the scenes" and "favor the interests of construction companies, irrigators 
and hydroelectric plants", leaving aside the objectives of environmental protection and with "officials cap-
tured” by those interests. The reason that this interviewee finds for this result also came out in many more 
conversations. For our interviewee 18, "the Andalusian PSOE has always bought social peace" and "the 
rural is very important in Andalusia": "the mayors have been more concerned with irrigation than with 
supply water". In this way, when the regional administration "hit the mayor, they told you 'you're going 
against the interest of the party because I'm running for the elections'" (interviewee 18). 
 
                                                     
3 We do not know of any study on the sociodemographic characteristics of the personnel at the service of Basque local, foral or 
autonomous administrations, but historian Manu Montero studied the composition of Basque elected positions in representative 
institutions and found that people with a Basque surname were notably overrepresented regarding the distribution of these sur-







When asked about the ERE case, probably the largest case of embezzlement of public funds that has oc-
curred in Spain (Jiménez, 2014), many of our interviewees again mentioned the same idea that the Anda-
lusian PSOE governments tended to achieve the objective of maintaining “social peace” by distributing 
public aid as quickly as possible and without carrying out overly efficient control (interviews 13, 14, 15, 18). 
 
Resources for mobilization 
 
Many of our interviewees referred to factors such as the greater relative economic backwardness of Anda-
lusia, the importance of its primary sector and the relevance that its rural population still has as important 
elements that made this AC a society more inclined to the development of clientelistic relationships: “There 
is a lack of dynamism in Andalusian society, except in Almería; they are waiting for the Administration to 
come to solve their problems” (interviewee 18). Or as another interviewee who is an expert in spatial plan-
ning sums up, Andalusia “is a clientelistic society, it is more agrarian, accustomed to the favors of the gen-
tleman; the PSOE clearly took the place of the landlord (señorito)” (interviewee 15). 
 
By contrast, many of those interviewed in the Basque Country described a very different type of society: 
“Here [in Euskadi] you don't wait for aid to arrive; here [society] is more about generating its own resources 
by itself; the cooperative tradition, like that of the Mondragón group, has led to the development of a 
democratic culture of participation and transparency that is not found elsewhere” (interviewee 7). The in-
terviewees also referred to the existence of dense social networks in Basque society (interviewees 1, 2, 4, 7), 
although some of them also pointed out that behind this positive facade “there is a lot of subsidy culture 
that you don't see, mainly consulting companies and contractors, although some are not favored more than 
others, but companies know very well how to behave so as not to antagonize the government” (interviewee 
9). 
 
Beyond these impressions, the statistical data also clearly contrasts two very different societies with very 
different mobilization capacities for collective action in favor of Basque society. Table 4 lists a selection of 
some of these indicators that illustrate such differences with sufficient clarity. 
 
TABLE 4: STATISTICAL DATA ON RESOURCES FOR MOBILIZATION 




TION OF EMPLOYMENT 
BY COMPANIES’ SIZE, 
2015 
1* 2* 3* 4* 5* 1* 2* 3* 4* 5* 
5,9 43,1 29,5 12 9,4 5,1 35,3 27,6 17,4 14,6 
ORGANIZATIVE CAPAC-
ITY 
% ACTIVE POPULATION 










ING RATE, April 2020 (% 
youth between 18 and 24 
y.o.) 
21,6% 6,7% 
FINANCIAL MEANS PER CÁPITA GNP, 2018 19.107,5€ 33.222,93€ 
FINANCIAL MEANS 
GROSS AVAILABLE IN-
COME PER HOUSEHOLD 
PER CAPITA, 2017 
€ per inhabitant 
Spain Index = 
100 






























* 1: without employees; 2: microenterprises (<10 employees); 3: small (between 10 and 49); 4: medians (between 50 
and 249); 5 large (250 or more). 
** Associative density calculated from the total number of associations divided by every 10,000 inhabitants. 
Sources: Employment distribution by company size (INE 2015 data prepared by Reig Martínez et al., 2016); INE for 
Active Population in Agriculture; INE for population with higher education; Eurostat for early school leaving; Eurostat 
for GDP per capita; INE for gross income per household 2017; INE for AROPE rate; EGM 2018 data for newspaper 
reading; Regional registries of associations (data from 2019 for Euskadi and 2018 for Andalusia) and 2019 municipal 
register of the INE for associative density. 
 
 
As we can see, in each of the five components in which our model of analysis divides this dimension of 
resources for collective action, the data show a greater capacity for mobilization in the Basque Country. 
Regarding the tendency to associate, we see that the statistic on associative density does not make great 
differences, so we asked directly about this matter in our survey. Specifically, we include two indicators: one 
on whether the respondent believes that it is a waste of time to associate with others to pursue collective 
goals, and another on whether or not they belong to an association and of what type. The differences do 
not reach statistical significance. 
 
Attitudes and beliefs that help resolve cognitive dissonance to carry out or justify behaviors contrary to 
socially accepted rules 
 
The fourth and last dimension of our model is the one that we have studied in more detail through our 
survey and the results obtained are interesting. They are presented grouped around the four components 
that we have differentiated in the model of analysis: trust; perception of corruption; expectations about 
others; and particularistic values. 
 
Generalized and institutional trust 
 
The first of these elements is the trust that citizens place in other members of society and in the main public 
institutions. From what we know of those countries that stand out for their QoG, a high value in it is 
associated with high values in both generalized and institutional trust levels (Uslaner, 2013). Therefore, we 
should find substantial differences in these variables between our two cases. Figure 5 shows how there is a 
slightly higher level of generalized trust in the Basque Country than in Andalusia. However, the association 










FIGURE 5: IN GENERAL, WOULD YOU SAY THAT MOST PEOPLE CAN BE TRUSTED OR THAT YOU ARE 




Where we do find very substantial differences between our two Autonomous Communities is in institutional 
trust. Except for the high mistrust that political parties arouse in both territories, all the differences are 
statistically significant and, in some cases, such as the security forces or the regional government, they reach 
quite intensity. 
 
These significant differences present very different patterns in both regions. While in Andalusia, confidence 
in the central institutions of the State, such as the central government, the administration of justice or the 
security forces is positive, that raised by the institutions closest to citizens such as the regional government, 
the provincial council and the city council it is much smaller. And the opposite happens in the Basque 
Country: the closest institutions are valued positively while those of the central State are highly negative. 



































Figure 7 shows the result of the MCA for this first component of the fourth dimension of our analysis. We 
include also trust in the central (federal) government. The graph shows a better level of trust of our Basque 
respondents than of our Andalusian ones although, as already said, the differences in generalized trust are 
not statistically significative. 
 






















Perception of corruption 
 
As shown in Table 3, in order to analyze the differences between our two territories regarding this subdi-
mension of our model of analysis, we pay attention to five indicators from our survey: the perception of the 
existence of corruption in the autonomous government; the belief that corruption is not adequately prose-
cuted in the respective Autonomous Community; the conviction that no information would appear in the 
local press if a corruption case occurred; the degree of agreement with the idea that, in general, in that AC 
public officials are honest; and the perception that the public administrations of the CA are basically trans-
parent. 
 
Except for the assessment of the capacity of the local press to report on cases of corruption in which there 
are no significant differences between the two Autonomous Communities, in the rest of the indicators the 
differences are very significative, although not equally intense. The most intense are given in the assessment 
of the transparency of public administrations and in the perception of the honesty of those who hold public 
positions. In both cases, the most positive view corresponds to Basque citizens, as would be expected from 
a territory with a higher level of quality of government according to EQI. 
 
Likewise, it is Basque citizens who perceive less impunity for corruption and a lower level of corruption in 
the autonomous government, although here the association is less intense. In general, we can say that sus-
picions about possible corrupt behavior in public administrations are notably more widespread in Andalusia 
than in Euskadi. This fact fuels a spiral of a vicious circle of corruption in Andalusia compared to the Basque 
Country, since it becomes easier to face the cognitive dissonance produced by non-compliance with formal 
rules when you think you are surrounded by people who violate them. 
 
Figure 8 shows an MCA for a couple of these variables. For this map, we have selected the perception of 
our respondents about both the honesty of public officials and the transparency of public administrations. 
Again, the figure shows how Basque respondents have more positive perceptions on both issues, although 



























Expectations on opportunistic behavior 
 
Along the same lines, we should also find that expectations about the behavior of others are clearly more 
negative in Andalusia than in the Basque Country. We introduced seven indicators in our survey to collect 
expectations about the particularistic behavior of others in the respondents’ environment: we asked if the 
Basques / Andalusians are honest people; if they generally comply with the laws; if many people turn to a 
‘contact’ to solve their problems and if it seems logical that they do so; if in Basque / Andalusian society no 
one really needs to recur to a contact; if faced with a conflict of interest, a public official is expected to act 
partially or impartially; if to be successful in Spanish society, the most important thing is to have good 
contacts and nurture them; and if you can skip the waiting lists in the Basque / Andalusian healthcare system 
if you have a good contact. 
 
It is true that we found significant differences in five indicators of this set of expectations about the oppor-
tunistic or particularistic behavior of the others between the Basque Country and Andalusia.  
The expectations of the Andalusians are significantly worse than those of the Basques. However, unexpect-
edly since the difference in QoG between the two regions is so high, the intensity of these differences is 
low. 
 
In fact, the differences in terms of pointing out the importance of cultivating contacts to achieve economic 
or professional success are non-existent, and the difference in the fact that a contact is used to solve prob-
















FIGURE 10: IF POSSIBLE, MANY PEOPLE TURN TO A CONTACT TO SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS MORE 




Among the other 5 variables where differences between both regions are statistically significative, it is con-
venient to group them into two different sets.  On the one hand, there are two variables that show expec-
tations that do not encourage opportunistic behaviors in either of the two regions. The perception that our 
respondents have about the honesty of the rest of their fellow citizens and whether they generally comply 
with the laws is highly positive, although it is somewhat better in the Basque Country. Figures 11 and 12 









































On the other hand, the remaining three variables on the perception of the behavior of fellow citizens in our 
survey show an evident preference for particularistic expectations in both societies, despite their higher 





































FIGURE 14: WHAT DO YOU THINK MOST PUBLIC OFFICIALS DO WHEN THEY HAVE TO DECIDE 































They try to help their
relative but avoiding
harming the rest of
the applicants
They solve the case in
an impartial way
They decline to solve
the case and ask a







FIGURE 15: DO YOU THINK THAT IN BASQUE / ANDALUSIAN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM IT IS POSSIBLE TO 




Figure 16 shows our MCA with three of these variables on expectations together. In this case, we show the 
indicators on how the respondents expect a public official will solve a conflict of interest, on whether they 
think contacts are needed in their society and, lastly, on whether they think it is possible to skip the waiting 
lists in the health system if one has a contact. We can see that, although Andalusia is closer to the most 
particularistic options, the Basque Country is still too distant from the options that we could regard as the 
most universalistic. 
 






















At first sight, it would be expected that between two territories with such different QoG values we could 
find notable differences in the range of values that we could consider as particularistic. However, the liter-
ature on corruption has been pointing out at least since the early work of Robert Klitgaard and Susan Rose-
Ackermann that expectations about the behavior of others matter much more to the extent of corruption 
than people's own values. In fact, Klitgaard (2015) has always argued that not even in the most corrupt 
societies on the planet there are individuals who consider corruption as a value. For this reason, we do not 
expect the results in these indicators to show relevant differences between our two territories. 
 
As anticipated in Table 3, our questionnaire contained five indicators to measure the extent of particularistic 
values in our two Autonomous Communities: we asked how an official should resolve a conflict of interest 
situation when deciding a matter that affected a family member or a friend; on whether it is acceptable to 
do a favor, give something away or give money to obtain something from a public administration; or, finally, 
if it is admissible for a politician to break a law to be effective in solving a public problem. In none of the 
five indicators significant differences have been found between our two communities. 
 
Figure 17 shows the MCA for this fourth component of the fourth dimension of our analysis. It can clearly 
be seen that differences between our two regions are non-existent on the very limited spread of particular-
istic values among their populations. 
 













Talking about each one of the four main dimensions in our model of analysis, clear differences have been 
observed in the degree of politicization of the Basque and Andalusian public administrations, although some 
nuances have been detected in the Basque Country. Specifically, our interviewees have referred to some 
problems such as the following: the inexistence of a professional public management; the accumulation of 
a very high volume of temporary workers; and, finally, the growing primacy of the criterion of political trust 
over professional worth when selecting officials to carry out managerial tasks. 
 
Regarding the second dimension of our analysis, which has to do with the inclination of political leaders 
towards clientelism, the differences found have also been clear, but, once again, doubts have arisen in the 
Basque Country about the consequences of the PNV's political hegemony to when it comes to developing 
clientele exchange networks. 
 
Concerning the resources for mobilization that allow collective action, it is probably the dimension of our 
model in which the differences between our two cases are greater and more evident. However, many of 
these differences are the result of a different degree of economic development, although it must be remem-
bered that development is usually pointed out in the literature as a consequence of the level of institutional 
quality and not vice versa (North, 1990; Acemoglu et al, 2005). 
 
Finally, with regard to the elements that contribute to reducing cognitive dissonance, the following three 
findings can be drawn. In the first place, we find substantial differences in the levels of institutional trust, 
although with different standards depending on whether we speak of central (federal), on the one hand, or 
regional and local institutions, on the other, but, strikingly, we do not find differences in terms of generalized 
trust. 
 
Regarding the perception of corruption, we find notable differences in the perception of the honesty of 
public officials and the transparency of public administrations, in both cases in favor of the Basque Country. 
Finally, it is striking that the differences in the extent of particularistic expectations, which could lead to an 
easier justification of opportunistic behaviors, are not too intense between our two territories and that, even 
in the Basque Country, relevant particularistic expectations prevail. 
 
This being so, we should end up drawing two main conclusions from this analysis. In the first place, the 
most obvious is that, although there are many elements that support differences in the quality of government 
in our two cases, the detection of a notable degree of particularism in the Basque Country could lead to 
question whether we are really facing such a clear case of high QoG. This assessment should lead us to the 
second conclusion of this study. 
 
It is necessary to fine tune the measurement of the QoG. The measurement used by the University of 
Gothenburg for its EQI includes three pillars, the perception of the respondents about the extent of cor-
ruption, the impartiality with which public administrations operate and the quality of public services such 
as education, health and police. Although it seems reasonable to assess the quality of public services when 
considering QoG, it will surely be necessary to connect this dimension with the economic resources availa-






QoG according to the EQI is this pillar of the quality of services, a pillar in which the Basque Country 
comes to occupy the 37th position of all the European regions studied. However, as we see in Table 5, the 
comparison between the economic resources per inhabitant managed by the Basque government in relation 
to the Andalusian government shows the enormous comparative advantage that the former has over the 
latter. Surely, it is more adjusted to reality and to the good analysis of the quality of government that a 
weighted formula is found so that differences due to available resources do not weigh so much when deter-
mining the level of QoG of one society or another generating tautological explanations. 
 
 
TABLE 5: DIFFERENCES IN THE VOLUME OF AVAILABLE ECONOMIC RESOURCES FOR THE BASQUE 
AND ANDALUSIAN GOVERNMENTS 
 
VARIABLE 
BASQUE GOV. ANDALUSIAN GOV. 
€ X inhabitant 
% of autonomic 
GNP 
€ X inhabitant 
% of autonomic 
GNP 
Executed public budget (expenditures) 
per capita, 2018 
5.504,4 16,57% 4.312,8 22,57% 
Health spending per capita, 2018 1.753 5,3% 1.212 6,3% 
Per capita spending on education, 2018 1.258 3,79% 969 5,07% 
Per capita R&D expenditure, 2017 623 1,94% 169,2 0,95% 
Sources: Ministry of Finance for executed budgets (expenditures); Ministry of Health for health spending; Ministry of 





This paper makes two relevant contributions to the study of the quality of government. On the one hand, 
a new model of analysis has been built based on 4 large dimensions that cover both supply and demand for 
an impartial exercise of public power. In addition, an operationalization of this model has been carried out 
using information from three different sources: expert interviews; a public opinion survey with original 
indicators; and data from official statistics. On the other hand, this model has been applied to contrast two 
case studies chosen for their opposite values, reaching the conclusion that the differences found between 
them are not as substantial as might be expected. This fact invites us to develop measures of the quality of 
government that are not as influenced as to date by differences in access to resources on which the quality 
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List of interviews 
1. Former senior official of the Basque government with long experience in personnel management. Madrid, 
February 15, 2020 
2. Associate professor of political science at the UPV. Durango, March 3, 2020. 
3. Former senior official of the Basque government with responsibilities in public administration. San Se-
bastián, March 4, 2020. 
4. Professor at the UPV and essayist on issues of good governance. San Sebastián, March 4, 2020. 
5. Councilor of the Bilbao City Council. Bilbao, March 4, 2020. 
6. University professor and public administration consultant. San Sebastián, March 4, 2020. 
7. Former senior official of the Basque government with responsibilities in matters of public function. Vi-
toria, March 5, 2020. 
8. Physician complaining of fraud in the Osakidetza opposition, and two heads of an anti-corruption asso-
ciation. Vitoria, March 5, 2020. 
9. Journalist. Bilbao, March 5, 2020. 
10. Professor of political science at the UPV. Bilbao March 5, 2020. 
11. Union leader. Bilbao, March 6, 2020. 
12. Lawyer. Bilbao, March 6, 2020. 
13. Retired experts in social studies, spatial planning, and education. Córdoba, March 9, 2020. 
14. Former senior official of the Junta de Andalucía with responsibilities in Education and RTV. Seville, 
March 9, 2020. 
15. Professor at the US and former senior position in land planning issues in the Junta de Andalucía and 
the Ministry of Development. Seville, March 10, 2020. 
16. Former president of the Junta de Andalucía. Seville, March 10, 2020. 
17. Former senior official with responsibilities in R&D management on the Junta de Andalucía. Seville, 
March 10, 2020. 
18. Former senior official of the Junta de Andalucía with responsibility for water and irrigation policies. 






19. Former high position in the Junta de Andalucía and secretary general in a large city council. Malaga, 
March 11, 2020. 
20. Professor at the UMA expert in urban planning. Malaga, March 11, 2020. 
 
